Saturday, January 8, 2011

Clusters, Technopolis, And A New Industrial Policy

Sorry I've been absent for a while. (I hope you missed me!) Here's one thing that's been keeping me busy:

Having played a role in Austin's transformation into “Silicon Hills,” and having consulted for various cities that hope to boost their own high tech economies – and having written a book about it back in '06 – I've been traveling and speaking for UNESCO, helping Asian, Caribbean, and Latin American countries launch their technopolis initiatives. Domestically, the Obama administration has made industrial clusters an important part of its innovation policy. An official of a very large US government agency called me up in late summer, heaped praise on my book, and said, “Dr. Phillips, you must consult for us.”

My ego, and to some extent my wallet, have expanded. My free time for blogging has shrunk.

The aspirations of my audiences and clients span the spectrum of:
  • Boosting the capacity of indigenous universities.

  • Getting these universities to see value in applied and industrial research, and in the transfer/commercialization of research product.

  • Building science and technology parks.

  • Building knowledge-based manufacturing and logistics parks.

  • Building entire science cities from greenfield.

  • Building “clusters” in targeted industries.

  • Developing technopoleis that encompasses most or all the above, combined with a pervasive social commitment to local innovation and the quality-of-life that attracts young knowledge workers.

The word technopolis, of Greek lineage, found its way into Japanese at the time Japan's first science city, Tsukuba, was planned. (And yes, that is the proper Greek plural in the last bullet above.) The word was first embraced in the US by Bechtel Corporation, an architecture and construction firm that saw in the trend a promising new market segment. Since, the sense of the word has evolved to denote high-tech metropolitan regions (and the accompanying social commitment mentioned above) like California's Silicon Valley, Austin, North Carolina's Research Triangle, northern Virginia's beltway, India's Bangalore, France's Sophia Antipolis, and others that I've listed here. (That web site is long neglected also; I'll soon con a student into updating it.) Strong new initiatives like Russia's Skolkovo arise regularly.

The later notion of cluster, due to Prof. Michael Porter of Harvard, implies a process of lock-in and positive returns to scale in a region when an “anchor company,” highly innovative and active in exporting product from the region, attracts supplier and customer companies that benefit from proximity to the anchor firm. The spillover benefit of knowledge exchange becomes so great that companies in the cluster are reluctant to leave the region even if they are offered a better tax break elsewhere.

The cluster idea refers to companies and company groups only. Technopolis refers to the social, entrepreneurial, and infrastructural environment of a metro region. A technopolis can host several clusters, viz. the electronics and aerospace clusters in Silicon Valley. Similarly, Portland, Oregon is home to a semiconductor innovation cluster, a flat-panel display cluster, and an educational technology cluster. (The New York Times credited me as the godfather of the latter.) Contrariwise, San Diego hosts the world's foremost biotech cluster, but it is a city of military bases, retirement communities, immigrant small businesses, and suppliers to maquila manufacturers, i.e., not a true technopolis.

My own contribution to these efforts focuses on the role of social capital in technopolis development, and of course the role of universities. Frances Fukuyama, perhaps best known for a silly book on “the end of history,” wrote another, absolutely splendid book called Trust. In it, he defined social capital as the tendency of people to form voluntary associations. Not government-driven projects, and not family enterprises, but voluntary organizations at a meso level. Fukuyama documented that countries with a higher tendency to social capital were richer countries.

Early in the 2000's, I had been looking for a conceptual bin that would hold my high-tech economic development experiences from Austin, Portland and elsewhere. Fukuyama's was it. (He did not invent the social capital concept, but was the first to apply it to regional wealth.) I ran with it, applied it to technopolis, and a book and several journal articles and policy papers have resulted. I find technopolis consulting fascinating because of its combination of technology, social culture, geography, architecture, and so on, and because of the hugely varying cultures and constraints under which diverse countries are attempting their initiatives.

When I arrived in Daejeon in November to speak, my Korean hosts at the World Technopolis Association told me, “Hi Fred, the S&T Minister of [a certain very pleasant tropical country] is here, and we told the Minister she needs you to consult on her science park project.” Ah, I love it. As these projects progress and are publicly announced, I'll share more details with you.

The current US administration's emphasis on clusters is a clever one. By financially supporting scattered metro areas' own choices of targeted industries, it sidesteps the “Washington picking winners” approach which has been more or less extinct since the Reagan years, and which would be opposed by all Republicans and even most Democrats. It also makes best use of federal dollars by leveraging the positive returns to scale that characterize successful clusters.

There now seems to be nearly universal awareness that innovation is the key to productivity increase and thus a better and more sustainable standard of living. There is at least hope that this holds true in any region of the world. There is a (pleasantly surprising, to me) near-universal acceptance that initiatives to spur innovation need to be geographically focused, in “growth poles,” as opposed to scattering funds to every district of a country. All these principles point to specialized parks and regional cluster and technopolis efforts as the right way to go.

**
A commenter asked whether the Internet makes geography (and hence clustering) obsolete, or if not, how it changes the role of geography in industrial development. And, he asked, does “deep history” matter? I reply with this addendum:

Deep history sure does make a difference. Portland's radio and instrumentation cluster, and the Oulu (Finland) telecomm cluster stemmed from those two region's histories of government forestry operations in remote areas, and the need for the ranger towers to communicate with one another. Austin's techno-entrepreneurial success leveraged the Texas oil wildcatter tradition of taking risk and forgiving (possibly multiple) entrepreneurial failure. Columnist Andy Mukherjee noted that:
[In] 1911 India's British rulers invited Nobel-laureate chemist William Ramsay to help select a site for a science school. Ramsay chose Bangalore.
[In the] 1950s and 1960s Independent India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru set up state-owned engineering companies near Bangalore to fulfill his vision of rapid industrialization. He selected Bangalore because of the talent available at the Indian Institute of Science, the school set up by Ramsay.

A second factor is a great or near-great university willing to engage in industry outreach, and providing a large and steady flow of qualified graduate engineers. The University of Texas at Austin, Stanford in Silicon Valley, the Indian Institute of Science, MIT in the Boston area, etc. This is a problem for the still highly scholastic universities in the former Soviet states.

Third, sometimes, a dynamic, charismatic
and high-profile individual who drives the process. Frederick Terman (the teacher of Hewlett and Packard) at Stanford, George Kozmetsky (founder of Teledyne, longtime business dean at UT, and mentor to Michael Dell) in Austin, Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore, etc.

Fourth, what I call the “edge city” phenomenon. In my view, the major centers of culture and population are inherently conservative. We can expect to see more freewheeling innovative behavior in smaller cities on the 'edge' of the major centrifugal cultural forces, but not too far out in the boondocks. (Moreover, real estate prices and intra-city travel times in the biggest cities are too high to support tech cluster formation.) This is why we see the most dramatic techno-preneurial flowering in Austin, not Dallas; Curitiba, not São Paulo; Daejeon, not Seoul; Bangalore, not New Delhi; San Jose, and not San Francisco.
(Joel Garreau uses 'edge city' to mean an exurb of any major city, different from my usage.)

Fifth, a timely crisis can tip matters toward cluster growth. Bangalore's IT sector's great boost was all the programming needed to respond to the “Year 2000 crisis” - remember that? And Austin's
software cluster took off after oil, cattle, and real estate prices in Texas all tanked at once in the 1980s.

You are right also about “random” occurrences. Where the forestry thing was deep history, Terman's move back to California from Boston was accidental history - but pivotal. So were the crises in Texas and India. More such tipping points in technopoleis' histories are documented.

The Internet does not trump geography in cluster formation. A distinction that I believe is due to Ichijiro Nonaka is that between “formal
knowledge” and “tacit knowledge.” The former can be written down and squirted over wires. The latter requires working side by side with someone. The engineering writer Henry Petroski recalls how as a young paperboy he could not fold the newspapers according to instructions, but needed personal mentoring by older newsboys. This is why they say “technology transfer is a body contact sport.” When companies depend heavily on tacit knowledge transfer, collocation is essential.

So in a way (sixth!) some collocation and cluster formation is due to wide adoption of
“Japanese” lean manufacturing techniques, which require reducing the number of suppliers. Rather than making suppliers compete for your business more or less blindly, you (the manufacturer) choose the one or two suppliers that have the greatest capacity for organizational learning, then help them learn, in exchange for long-term, volume procurement contracts at low prices.

Of course the Internet does foster tech
entrepreneurship and tech industry growth by making outsourcing, offshoring, alliances, etc. easier due to broadband communication of formal knowledge (specs, schedules, etc.) over distance.

Friday, March 20, 2009

Visit to Hsinchu Science Based Industrial Park





In January - after 33 years! - I returned to Taiwan and at long last had an opportunity to visit the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park. Long held as a good example of government-led technology-based economic development, HSBIP appeared in my 2006 book  The Technopolis Columns, in the form of an account by Dr. Alvin Tong. 

(Dr. Tong is a longtime friend and faculty colleague, and was the first Deputy Director-General of the park. He kindly arranged my park tour. The book is pictured here, as I exchanged gifts with Mr. Tuan, an official of the park).

The park, opened in 1980, is administered under the National Science Council of the Executive Yuan. The park has 300 employees and is one of twelve science parks in Taiwan.

HSBIP now hosts 432 companies, and 17 more are approved for tenancy. Of these companies, 376 are domestic and 54 are foreign. Collectively they employ 130,000 people (average age 30), generate 1.2 trillion New Taiwan Dollars in revenue, and have given rise to 4400 patents. HSBIP maintains relations with 24 "sister science parks" in twelve countries.

Only 1.3% of HSBIP tenant company employees have Ph.D.s. This surprising fact points up the theme of the park and brings us back to the park's name (science-based industrial park): Though it is commonly called a science park, it is really about manufacturing.

HSBIP officials attribute the park's success to the interaction of these factors:
  • Environment and services
  • Incentives and availability of venture capital
  • Quality of human resources
  • Industry clusters and industry-academic links for R&D.
The environment includes high quality of life at affordable cost, and business services including 24-hour automated customs for tenant companies' exports. 

Tax incentives/exemptions, government investment, low-interest loans, and "R&D encouragement grants" round out the picture of incentives. However, the success of HSBIP has led the Taiwan government to plan to discontinue tax incentives for high-tech, and transfer them to solar and green industries.

Tsinghua University (science) and Chiao-Tung National University (engineering) are located on the periphery of the park, enhancing industry-university cooperation. ITRI also has two campuses adjoining the HSBIP, and runs incubators for new firms there.

The breakdown of tenant companies is:
  • Semiconductor -   72%
  • Optoelectronics - 16% 
  • Computers -           8%
  • Telcom - small percentage
  • Precision machinery - small percentage
  • Biotech -               0.3%
In the photo above, you can see pictures of the CEOs of Taiwan's two largest semiconductor firms. Both frequent a temple (look at the background) near HSBIP to pray for their companies' success.













Postscript, quoted from TIME magazine March 23, 2009: "At Taiwan's Hsinchu Science Based Industrial Park, home to many of the island's flagship tech firms, most workers are taking unpaid leave at least one day a week. Ryan Wu, chief operating officer of the job-search website 1111 Job Bank, say conditions at Hsinchu have never been so dire. 'There's extreme panic right now,' Wu says."

Saturday, January 24, 2009

Infrastructure 2.0: What will it look like?

“Web 2.0” means more interactivity, user-generated content, optimized search and cross-connections, free software, and fees for service. The term emphasizes the contrast with the first wave of web activity, called “content-push” or Web 1.0, really just an electronic form of old-style publishing, with some hyperlinks thrown in.

Tom Friedman uses “Car 2.0” to describe Better Place’s electric car cum business model in which consumers buy miles on swappable batteries recharged using clean energy.

President Obama is about to launch massive infrastructure projects for economic recovery. Governors of every state have lists of “shovel-ready” projects that will absorb billions of federal money, no problem.  But you can bet these projects are “Infrastructure 1.0.”

What will “Infrastructure 2.0” look like?

Like Car 2.0, Infra 2.0 will blend high technology with innovative business models, some involving public-private cooperation. Smart technology will be central to transforming the delivery of water, sewage, energy, telecomm, transportation, garbage disposal…

Look sharp, now, because if Obama doesn't spend the money in 2009, it won’t kick-start the economy.  If we spend it on more Infra 1.0, the economy will end up even farther behind the 8-ball, in the long run. We don’t yet know what Infra 2.0 is, but we’d better figure it out quick.

Hit the ‘comment’ button and tell me your vision of Infrastructure 2.0.

Sunday, July 27, 2008

Cross-referencing my blogs

1.   The Conscious Manager. International perspectives on management, technology, media, and personal growth.

2.   Technopolis Times. Resources for technology-based regional economic development. Technopolis Times encourages networking and alliances that help grow new and established technopoleis.  This blog is the new home of the Review of Technology and Economic Development newsletter.

3.   MsM Partners' Conference Blog. Annual research and business forum for Maastricht School of Management's outreach partners, representing more than 30 countries. 

I've also become Consulting Editor for the Management of Technology and Innovation area at Elsevier's Scirus Topic Pages.  The blogs and Scirus will sometimes refer to each other.

Sunday, July 20, 2008

New Format for Review of Technology & Economic Development

The Review of Technology & Economic Development newsletter has been serving the economic development and scholarly communities since 2003. Back issues may be downloaded at http://www.generalinformatics.com/technopolistimes.html#worldwide

We have had a short hiatus in publication, and now resume the work on this blog site. The new format will allow you to contribute material, by posting comments on any entry. You can also subscribe to an RSS feed. Please participate!

Backgrounders and databases will continue to reside at http://www.generalinformatics.com/technopolistimes.html. Visit that site any time.

Looking forward to your feedback.

Editorial (long): Just-in-Time and its Hazards

A hot day on the US-Mexico border.  Twin cities, one on either side of the international line. An economic development initiative that went wrong.  Or did it?

US and Japanese maquila firms came to our twin cities for easy access to ocean ports and to major US markets.  The cities, as promised, opened a second border crossing.  Other attractions were the usual for maquilas: cheap labor and tax-free transfers across the border.

The cities got job creation.  They wanted technology spillovers, too, and maybe they got them. (We’re not sure.)  The cities were ready to welcome the expected traffic congestion that accompanies economic growth.

Two other events came to pass.  One was predictable but not planned for: that the maquiladoras would use just-in-time (JIT) deliveries to streamline their manufacturing and minimize their inventory costs.  The second was less predictable: More and more suppliers to the maquila firms located on the US side of the border.

JIT minimizes inventory costs because the “OEM” (the manufacturer) doesn’t have to maintain extensive warehouse facilities, and doesn’t have to tie up cash in inventory.  Stuff arrives only when it’s needed.  It’s assembled into finished products and shipped out immediately.  JIT shifts inventory costs to suppliers, who must bring to the manufacturer what’s needed, exactly when it’s needed.  It also shifts costs to taxpayers, as we shall see.

The maquila scheme (later supplemented by the terms of NAFTA) supposed that manufacturers and suppliers would locate on the Mexican side.  As it turned out, less labor-intensive suppliers preferred to do business on the US side of the border, which they saw as a more congenial, predictable, and safe business environment.

These two unplanned developments had two consequences.  Instead of generating (for example) one delivery truck trip per week, each maquiladora locating in the Mexican city generated four truck trips per day. Due to the locations of suppliers and distributors, a much higher than expected percentage of these trips involve border crossings.

Now, each vehicle crossing the border must deal with Mexican Customs, US Homeland Security (Immigration and Customs), and truck safety inspection.  At least three separate stops.  Aerial photos of the crossing point show immense queues.  The costs of the trips – what with the delays in crossing – include driver and government inspector salaries, depreciation and wasted fuel as trucks idle for hours.

A full and realistic accounting of the costs must also mention the frustration of tourists who are crowded off the highway by trucks, or who are delayed in reaching their cross-border destinations, or who are so discouraged that they stay home, or vacation and shop elsewhere.

The companies are now asking for expansion of the existing border crossings, and construction of a new crossing.  The state transportation commissions on both sides of the border are eager to pour more concrete, and thus increase their budgets and influence. The state and city governments want to accommodate the maquila firms, because they’re afraid that otherwise the firms will relocate to other border towns with more malleable local governments. 

Let’s face four blunt facts:

  1. We pay taxes to build roads and amenities that benefit everyone, or at least a broad swath of the population.  When a road brings us free-spending tourists, that’s a legitimate reason to spend tax money on roads.  When the road just brings supplies to a handful of companies – and crowds out the tourists – it’s not a legitimate public expense.
  2. From an economic development perspective, we’d rather have the companies build warehouses.  The warehouses are taxable infrastructure that, as “improved real estate,” will still be there if the company ever folds or leaves the region.  Far preferable to JIT delivery, which doesn’t contribute to the tax base and in fact takes from it.
  3. Companies are backing away from JIT anyway, either abandoning it or going to hybrid supply chains.  Even when the main trunk roads are not congested, local city streets are congested.  Unpredictable traffic jams mean that true JIT is impossible.
  4. The companies are not likely to move away.

Why won’t they move away?  Ironically, the crossing expansion was being discussed at a local college that was preparing to turn out an increased number of logistics graduates to work in the maquilas.  The maquilas told the college that they wanted the expanded border crossings, but that their greatest need was for qualified graduates.  The maquilas on the Mexican side need logistics and manufacturing experts; the higher-tech suppliers on the US side need engineers.

I should mention also that the city on the US side (where the college is located) boasts a quality of life that far exceeds the QOL of any comparable border city.  In other words, qualified graduates want to live and work here.

As Richard Florida writes – and as proven by Intel’s empty threats to leave Oregon – when the knowledge workforce is highly qualified and highly entrenched, the companies are stuck.  In the case of our twin cities, the college will turn out the qualified, entrenched grads that will keep the companies here, regardless of whether border crossings are expanded.

Is more concrete and more crossing guards the best investment for the US state that is in a budget crisis and has many pressing expenditure opportunities elsewhere?  Are the twin cities and their respective states ready to call the bluff of the maquila firms?  Would expanded border crossings lay unused when the companies finally abandon JIT anyway?  How long will it be before streamlined Homeland Security procedures, and elimination of safety inspection for Mexican trucks entering the US, decrease waiting times at existing crossing points?

It’s hard to fault the companies for asking for all they can get from the local governments.  It’s hard to fault the transportation commissions from trying to increase their influence and maintain their budgets.  It’s not surprising that the maquilas are better negotiators than underpaid local economic development officials.  All that does not change the fact that we have a problem.

The problem is that we do not know how to jointly plan and allocate private costs and public costs.  The problem is that we don’t know how to incentivize private companies or state agencies to keep the public interest in mind.  As a professor, I must say the problem is that we teach corporate finance and public finance in separate silos, and fail to teach multiple companies and agencies how to coordinate with each other.

Until we teach system tools instead of tools for suboptimizing, we’ll see unnecessary concrete poured.  Until we teach a realistic view of the business-government interface, we’ll see more public investment diverted for private gain.  We won’t know whether economic development initiatives “work” or not.